The lack of launch cell compatibility makes it fielded in relatively low numbers aboard the compatible platforms. Multirole aircraft can field this weapon as well, making it the primary anti-ship missile for non-bomber PLA aircraft, such as land- and carrier-based aviation. For warships, it is primarily fielded in box launchers aboard Chinese frigates, corvettes, and small missile boats. It is similar to the Harpoon in being a smaller, shorter-ranged weapon that is not compatible with vertical launch cells. The YJ-83 is a relatively common Chinese anti-ship missile that is widely fielded across its surface and air forces. 3 These firing rates suggest that China has invested in a robust missile production industrial base and recognizes the value of building out deep inventories of precision weapons. ![]() The DoD made the same remark about 2020, with China firing 250 ballistic missiles that year, and earlier again for 2019, but with no accompanying figure. Department of Defense has stated that China conducted more than 135 ballistic missile live firings for testing and training in 2021, which “was more than the rest of the world combined,” excluding conflict zones. 2 While the recency of introduction suggests the inventory may not be deep enough for a major conflict, China’s precise weapon procurement rates are not as publicly discernible compared to U.S. (Author graphic)Įach of these weapons, save for perhaps the YJ-83, is relatively modern and introduced into China’s anti-ship arsenal within the past 10-15 years. Key traits of mainstay PLA anti-ship missiles. 1 While there are other anti-ship missiles in China’s inventory, those appear relatively uncommon compared to these five weapons. The YJ-12 serves as a primary weapon for bombers and coastal launchers the YJ-18 is a primary weapon for submarines and large surface warships the YJ-83 is fielded by multirole aircraft and surface warships smaller than destroyers and the DF-21 and DF-26 ballistic missiles are China’s most long-ranged land-based anti-ship weapons. These weapons should be assessed through a framework of the specific traits that highlight their mass firing potential, including launch cell compatibility, platform compatibility, range, maximum flight time, numbers of weapons procured, and numbers of weapons fielded per platform.Ĭhina’s main anti-ship missiles are the YJ-12, YJ-18, YJ-83, DF-21, and DF-26. These weapons and the way they have been distributed across platform types come together to form an outline for how China can mass fires against warships. Whichever side wields the superior combination of tools and methods for massing fires may earn a major advantage in deterrence and in conflict.Ĭhina has assembled a wide array of anti-ship missiles and naval force structure for generating massed fires. As both great powers build up and evolve their anti-ship firepower, it is critical to assess their respective schemes of massing fires, and how these schemes may compete and interact in a specific operational context, such as a war sparked by a Taiwan contingency. ![]() These weapons and the tactics that make use of them can be at the forefront of China’s ability to deny U.S. ![]() Read Part 7 on aircraft carrier roles in distributed warfighting.Ĭhina’s arsenal of anti-ship weapons is truly a force to be reckoned with, and is superior to that of the United States in many respects. Read Part 6 on platform advantages and combined arms roles. Read Part 5 on salvo patterns and maximizing volume of fire. Read Part 4 on weapons depletion and last-ditch salvo dynamics. Read Part 3 on assembling massed fires and modern fleet tactics. ![]() Read Part 2 on anti-ship firepower and U.S. Read Part 1 on defining distributed maritime operations.
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